Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 punishes “[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman’s child/children.”
The Supreme Court’s ruling in XXX v. People (G.R. No. E-00648, 29 July 2026) raises an important question concerning the mental element required for a conviction under Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262: when does a deliberate act that causes emotional anguish also sufficiently demonstrate the intent to inflict such emotional anguish?
The case involved a man who withdrew an application for a marriage license without informing the victim, despite knowing that she was pregnant and had already announced their impending marriage. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the conduct constituted emotional manipulation and public humiliation, and it was not merely a breach of promise to marry. The Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution established the elements of Section 5(i): (a) the parties had a sexual or dating relationship; (b) the accused willfully withdrew the marriage license application without notice after a public commitment; and (c) the withdrawal caused the victim emotional anguish, supported by her testimony and by the findings of a social welfare officer and a psychometrician, who found suicidal ideation, depressive symptoms, and restlessness. Specific intent to cause emotional anguish was not discussed to have been separately proven.
It must be analyzed whether the Supreme Court in that case created another exception to Acharon v. People (G.R. No. 224946, 9 November 2021), which interpreted the requisite proof of specific intent to hold an accused in violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262. In Acharon, the Supreme Court held that mere failure or inability to provide financial support does not establish a violation of Section 5(i). Criminal liability requires the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish. Absent that intent, the failure may result only in civil liability.
The Supreme Court subsequently recognized an exception to Acharon for marital infidelity. In XXX v. People (G.R. No. 252739, 16 April 2024), the Supreme Court held that, in cases of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific intent to cause mental or emotional suffering is already satisfied upon the commission of the infidelity itself, provided that the wife or child actually suffers the required psychological harm. The Supreme Court nevertheless acknowledged that Section 5(i) offenses are mala in se and ordinarily require specific criminal intent as in Acharon.
XXX v. People (G.R. No. E-00648, 29 July 2026) on the willful withdrawal of a marriage license should not automatically be read as establishing a broad second carve-out from Acharon. Unlike XXX v. People (G.R. No. 252739, 16 April 2024) on marital infidelity cases, the Supreme Court did not expressly state that intent to cause emotional anguish is conclusively presumed from every willful withdrawal of a marriage license application. The ruling does not also suggest that every failed engagement or cancelled wedding is criminal.
Instead, a narrower reading of the marriage license case is more defensible. The accused’s intent may be inferred from the totality of circumstances: knowledge of the pregnancy, a prior public commitment of the marriage, withdrawal of the marriage license without notice, and the foreseeable consequences of abandoning that commitment in those circumstances. “Willful” withdrawal supplies evidence of a conscious and deliberate act, while the surrounding circumstances may support the inference that the act was employed as emotional manipulation or public humiliation. In any event, the prosecution must still prove the resulting mental or emotional anguish.
This reading is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in XXX v. People that R.A. No. 9262 is a protective statute, where an act, even one involving marriage applications, is used as a tool to inflict psychological trauma on a woman in a dating or sexual relationship. The victim’s mental or emotional harm remains an essential and distinct element of the offense.
Accordingly, the case is best understood not as eliminating Acharon, but as applying its specific intent requirement through circumstantial evidence. For now, the safer doctrinal conclusion is that Acharon remains the general rule, while the marriage license ruling permits the inference of specific intent from a deliberate withdrawal made under circumstances reasonably understood to cause emotional anguish and public humiliation.



